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This paper deals with axiological confusion as seen in Tacitus’ Histories. Through the 
analysis of different cases in the historical narrative, it demonstrates Tacitus’ explanation of how 
emperors, generals or soldiers were brought to a state in which they were no longer able to discern 
what was good or bad for them. Tacitus saw fear and the uncertainty characteristic of the civil 
wars of AD 69 as originating a particular spiral of disloyalty and betrayal which accounted for 
the confusion in the agents’ moral judgement. By interspersing his narrative with outstanding 
examples of the virtues that counteracted the vices responsible for impairing correct moral 
reasoning, Tacitus showed models of conduct who managed to overcome the confusion and 
worked both for their own good and that of Rome. 
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Resumen 
Este trabajo trata sobre la confusión axiológica en las Historias de Tácito. A través del análisis 
de diferentes casos de la narrativa histórica, se busca demostrar cómo el historiador explica la 
manera en que emperadores, generales o soldados se encontraron en situaciones donde no fueron 
capaces de discernir lo que era bueno o malo para ellos. Para Tácito habría sido el miedo y la 
incertidumbre propios de las guerras civiles del año 69 d.C. lo que había originado una espiral 
específica de deslealtad y de traición que explicaría la confusión en el juicio moral de los agentes. 
Al intercalar ejemplos excepcionales de las virtudes que contrarrestan los vicios que alteran un 
razonamiento moral adecuado, Tácito prueba la presencia de modelos de conducta que 
consiguieron vencer la confusión y trabajar para su propio bien y el de Roma. 
 




In the year 44 BC Cicero wrote his De Officiis in the form of a letter to his son - 
though also intended for a wider audience - consisting of a treatise on the topic of the 
moral duties that a good Roman should observe in order to live in the best way. The 
influence of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius is particularly obvious and important in 
the first and second books (cf. Cic. Off. I 6-7), while the third shows more strongly 
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the independence of Cicero’s own moral thinking1. In any case, Cicero’s lessons on 
morality perfectly blend the traditional Roman code of conduct with Stoic ethical 
principles2. As such, the work presents an idealized picture of how to behave, and the 
examples are clear-cut, with little room for confusion or moral ambiguity (cf. Cic. 
Off. I 4). 
In the third book, Cicero discusses specifically the conflict between what is right 
(honestum) and what is expedient or beneficial (utile), and argues that one must try 
to maintain a difficult balance between moral principles on the one hand, and doing 
everything in one’s power to serve oneself, one’s own cause or the community on the 
other. Cicero maintains that the sometimes opposing categories of honest actions on 
the one hand, and beneficial actions on the other, are in some sense identical: «but for 
all cases we have one rule, with which I desire you to be perfectly familiar: that which 
seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or, if it is morally wrong, it must not 
seem expedient»3. He expands on this, explaining how to make a choice when 
conflicting values each present themselves as the highest good, and shows how it is 
only an apparent conflict, as nothing will be truly expedient that is not at the same 
time morally right, and vice versa.  
Several years after De Officiis, the Roman historian Tacitus follows a different 
path from Cicero. Rather than theorizing about how the right action is to be chosen, 
he examines the historical period that he is writing about and narrates situations where 
men have been placed in difficult circumstances and have had to make important 
moral choices. Through the narration of historical events, the historian’s goal is not 
only to illustrate how things happened, but also to explain why they happened. Like 
other Roman historians, Tacitus aims particularly at explaining, interpreting and 
understanding the past; he seeks to provide the reader with an account not only of the 
processes of how the decisions were taken, but also of their contexts and, more 
significantly, the emotional state of the people involved in taking those decisions. The 
historical narrative appears to be a particularly apt means to illustrate how axiological 
confusion happens in the real world. 
In his Histories4, for example, Tacitus depicts several cases where, for different 
reasons, people were not able to discern properly what was good or bad for them, and 
                                               
1 For De Officiis, see for example, GRIFFIN-ATKINS (1991), DYCK (1996) and more recently 
NEWTON (2016). 
2 For an account of the Stoic philosophical principles on this topic, see for example, M. Boeri, R. 
Brouwer, C. Veillard and G. Zago in this volume. 
3 Cic. Off. III 81: Sed omnium una regula est, quam tibi cupio esse notissimam: aut illud, quod utile 
videtur, turpe ne sit, aut si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. For a more detailed analysis of this particular 
passage, see REMER (2009), 1-29. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are taken from the Loeb 
editions with some modifications. 
4 The Histories of Tacitus is his first major historical narrative - the other one is the Annals - written 
after the three works that are commonly known as opera minora: Agricola, Germania and the Dialogus 
de Oratoribus. The Histories start narrating the events from 1st January AD 69 and is believed to have 
continued up to the death of Domitian in AD 96. Only Books I to IV survive in complete form, and part 
of Book V. 
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chose to do wrong thinking that it was right. Axiological confusion is shown especially 
clearly in the Histories because its action takes place during a «period rich in disasters, 
terrible with battles, torn by civil struggles, horrible even in peace»5. For the historian, 
it is a time of perplexity, misunderstanding and chaos in general, which produced 
such a confused state of affairs as to result in the cognitive impairment of the agents, 
preventing them from thinking clearly when deciding on a course of action. Among 
the evils of the age, Tacitus saw something particularly wrong about civil war; it 
appeared to involve a certain corruption from its origin, that added disorientation and 
bewilderment to the already bleak situation: «slaves were corrupted against their 
masters, freedmen against their patrons; and those who had no enemy were crushed 
by their friends»6. 
One of the main goals of this paper is to show how axiological confusion worked 
in practice with emperors, soldiers, or people in general, through the historical 
narrative of one of the acutest Roman historians. The specific period that the first 
books of the Histories narrate, the civil wars of AD 69, provide a particularly rich and 
contrasting setting for this confusion. Even though Rome had undergone other serious 
crises in her political history, what seemed novel in the crisis that arose after Nero’s 
death was the coming together of so many negative factors: weak and inept emperors 
ruled, bad and self-centred generals had to control undisciplined and rebellious 
armies, foreign wars had to be fought in remote parts of the Empire, feeble and 
inactive magistrates and senators had to govern over the different factions that divided 
the city. Tacitus seems particularly keen to highlight the generalized state of confusion 
and distrust at all levels of society, the widespread weakness in people that brought 
out the worst in them7.  
In what follows, I will deal, in the first place, with the characteristics or conditions 
present in Tacitus’ narrative that caused confusion in the moral judgement of the 
actors, seen specifically in Galba’s betrayal and assassination. Secondly, I will look at 
how Tacitus considers the successive treasons of different commanders under the 
emperor Vitellius. In the final part of the paper, I suggest that, besides depicting 
axiological confusion abundantly in the Histories, Tacitus also presents significant 
examples of the qualities that could counteract the fear and mistrust which seemed to 




According to Tacitus, the chaotic situation at Rome during what has been called 
‘the year of the four emperors’8 appeared to have been seriously aggravated by the 
                                               
5 Tac. Hist. I 2: opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saevum. 
6 Tac. Hist. I 2: corrupti in dominos servi, in patronos liberti; et quibus deerat inimicus per amicos 
oppressi. 
7 See, for example, Tac. Hist. I 88. 
8 Cf. GREENHALGH (1975); WELLESLEY (1975); MORGAN (2006); COSME (2012).  
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omnipresence of fear. In itself, this does not seem particularly novel. As David Levene 
puts it, «[f]or the Roman historians, no passion is more prominent than fear. Fear for 
them is perhaps the single most important influence on the behavior of individuals 
and states»9. Tacitus seems, therefore, to be following a certain tradition, and in the 
Histories, fear (metus) appears mainly as the negative emotion in response to danger 
or threat10. What is not depicted is the kind of healthy fear that helps one survive, for 
example, or that prevents rash actions. The fear that Tacitus talks about in the 
Histories is usually an extreme, even paralysing, fear; the kind that darkens judge-
ment11. There is fear in the people and in the armies; the senators, the generals and 
even the emperors themselves are said to have felt fear, so the historian expands the 
vocabulary to suit his purposes from metus to formido, to pavor and terror12.  
Although some of the manifestations of fear are physiological, Tacitus is more 
concerned with showing how it can activate particular behaviors or even cloud the 
reasoning of the intellect, and he presents it as working in several ways. In the first 
place, fear seems to have been an important feature during the Principate, especially 
because of its connection with adulatio (submissive flattery). This became almost a 
standard characteristic of politicians, whose fear of the powerful led them to 
unrestrained flattery (as Tacitus himself often says in this work)13. Furthermore, fear, 
expressed through adulation, was also particularly significant because of its profound 
relationship with servitus (servitude), as fear could - and did - take away the freedom 
to act honorably14. Servitus out of fear added to the lack of libertas, characteristic of 
the rule of the emperors (cf. Tac. Agr. 3, 1), resulting in a «passionate love for 
servitude», as Tacitus notes15.  
But above all, fear became a serious political feature which not only transformed 
Romans’ relationships with one another, but also conditioned the development of 
events in the political, military and social spheres. Fear in Tacitus’ Histories became a 
means - and an important one - of interaction between the emperor and his people, 
the generals and their armies, the leaders and the mob. Extreme fear resulted in 
complicated actions that destabilized the dynamics of the Roman political system. In 
                                               
9 LEVENE (1997), 128. 
10 Though in itself it need not be seen as necessarily a bad one, cf. Arist. EN III 7, 1115b 17-29 and 
also Sall. Jug. 41-42 with the idea of fear of the enemy (metus hostilis).  
11 For the topic of fear in the works of Tacitus, see, for example: HEINZ (1975); CARDAUNS (1981); 
MASTELLONE IOVANE (1989); CONDE (1991); MORGAN (1994b); LEVENE (1997); ZUCCARELLI (1999). 
For fear in ancient historiography in general, see for example, KNEPPE (1994); MARINCOLA (2003) and 
KAPUST (2008). 
12 It is remarkable to see how many times Tacitus uses fear-related words. In Book I alone, there are 
22 instances of words related with metus; 11 with formido; 10 with pavor; 9 with terror; 9 with trepido 
and 4 with timor.  
13 See, for example, at the beginning of the Histories I 1, where Tacitus talks about historians during 
the Principate who disregarded the truth «because of their passionate desire to flatter» (libidine 
adsentandi). See also I 32: «they acted according the traditional custom of flattering the emperor» 
(tradito more quemcumque principem adulandi); or I 47; I 74; I 90. Cf. KAPUST (2009). 
14 For flattery, see KAPUST (2018). 
15 Tac. Hist. I 90: libidine servitii. A similar claim appears in Ann. I 1; III 65. 
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Tacitus’ account, fear is seen not only as deterring people from a particular course of 
action, but also as triggering and motivating ignoble actions - fear as cause; and there 
were certain occasions when fear was even the outcome of some reactions and events, 
decisions or behaviors - fear as result16.  
It is in this metus in the context of civil wars that Tacitus locates the height of the 
axiological confusion which emperors, soldiers and the people experienced, and 
which, in a kind of spiral, escalated to unprecedented levels. However, that was not 
all. For him, this fear or metus felt by the characters in the Histories, that was 
intimately related to adulation and servility towards the powerful, was also capable of 
corrupting the most basic trait of human relationships: loyalty. It turned enmities and 
friendships upside down. 
The virtue of loyalty (fides) appears particularly tricky to follow and trace in times 
of civil wars. According to Tacitus, to fear, adulation and servitude, were necessarily 
added suspicion, mistrust and betrayal. Disloyalty, therefore, is a paramount element 
that becomes entangled in the vicious spiral of fear. The soldiers, the people, even 
important generals change sides according to the emotions of the day. Through his 
narrative, Tacitus shows how, most of the time, fides becomes meaningless when 
allegiances shift so quickly: if one had betrayed Galba, was it more honourable to be 
loyal to an Otho or a Vitellius? Was it honourable or even expedient for Vespasian to 
encourage Othonians or Vitellians to transfer their fides to his own cause? Expediency 
mingles with fear and the result is betrayal. In Tacitus’ Histories, metus corrupts fides 
among Romans - especially in commanders and the army - in a crescendo which 
almost necessarily ends in the axiological confusion of individuals. 
Right at the beginning of the Histories, while Tacitus announces the subject-
matter of his work, he also prepares the reader to encounter terrible things17. He 
presents the panorama of a «world that has been shaken to its foundations»18, and the 
description of the general political chaos goes on with extraordinary precision, until 
the people fell prey to such confusion that things that were traditionally seen as good 
started to be perceived as threats or even as decidedly evil: «high birth, wealth, the 
refusal or the acceptance of office, all gave ground for accusations, and virtues caused 
the surest ruin»19. By saying that virtues - the customary means to achieve glory and 
honour by Roman standards - caused destruction and annihilation, Tacitus declares 
that something was radically wrong. The violence of the struggle and fierce 
                                               
16 Some of these ideas have been explored in BALMACEDA (2017), 182-183, but from a different 
angle. 
17 Tac. Hist. I 2: Opus adgredior opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace 
saevum. Quattuor principes ferro interempti: trina bella civilia, plura externa ac plerumque permixta. 
See DAMON (2003), comm ad loc., who suggests that Tacitus omits the positive and exaggerates the 
negative. For disaster narrative in Tacitus, see KEITEL (2010). 
18 Tac. Hist. I 16: in hoc concussi orbis motu.  
19 Tac. Hist. I 2: nobilitas, opes, omissi gestique honores pro crimine et ob virtutes certissimum 
exitium. 
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competition of the would-be emperors and their undisciplined supporting armies 
would not end till they reached exhaustion and self-annihilation.  
The case of the emperor Galba (3 BC - AD 69), for example, who succeeds Nero 
in AD 68, clearly illustrates how some good qualities under the rule of fear are a mark 
for destruction. Servius Sulpicius Galba was probably the most illustrious Roman 
with regard to the nobility of his family, wealth and his achievements20. In Tacitus’ 
account, Galba’s display of amiability (facilitas) towards his friends (cf. Tac. Hist. I 
12); his moderation (moderatio) when governing Africa (cf. Tac. Hist. I 49), and 
uprightness (iustitia) as a proconsul of Hither Spain (cf. Tac. Hist. I 49), seemed to 
qualify him - at least at first sight - to become princeps. Besides, according to Tacitus, 
even in moments of great stress - such as the (mistaken) announcement of Otho’s 
death - Galba demonstrated strength and equanimity: «he showed a remarkable spirit 
in checking licence on the part of the soldiers; before threats he was unterrified, and 
incorruptible against flattery» (insigni animo ad coercendam militarem licentiam, 
minantibus intrepidus, adversus blandientis incorruptus, Tac. Hist. I 35).  
But, as Tacitus will show, all of these virtues did not seem to count for much, and 
they could not prevent Galba’s fall. On the contrary, the emperor’s severitas (severity) 
and vetera disciplina (old-fashioned rigor)21 proved dangerous to his and Rome’s 
safety because, as Tacitus indicates, the Romans could not endure them anymore22. 
For Tacitus, Galba, in fact, proved inadequate23: he exercised no prudence in the 
practice of traits which could have been good qualities, but which failed to adjust to 
the times. His lack of moderatio in the application of disciplina became something 
very near to cruelty, and his proverbial avaritia in not giving the customary donative 
to the soldiers certainly helped to ruin his reputation; to which problems were added 
that he was weak and old (invalidum senem)24. Furthermore, Tacitus adds that on 
certain occasions Galba had also shown a disgraceful lack of firmness (foeda incon-
stantia)25, and weakness of character (mobilitate ingenii), which resulted in great harm 
for Rome and the emperor himself: the rise of powerful freedmen, the greed of slaves, 
discreditable nominations for office, and a city for sale (cf. Tac. Hist. I 7). 
Galba’s failures to adapt to the mood of the times, especially his strictness and 
stinginess26, were also combined with the growing discontent of the urban troops, and 
the fear provoked by his bloody march and entry into the city of Rome, accompanied 
                                               
20 The other sources coincide in this with Tacitus, cf. Suet. Galb. 2-8; Plut. Galb. 3; 29; and D.C. 
LXIII 23. See also WELLESLEY (1975), 1-33; SOCHAT (1981a); SYME (1982); MURISON (1993), 31.  
21 For references to Galba’s stinginess and severity see, for example, Plut. Galb. 3; 15; 18; 22; Suet. 
Galb. 6; 12; 14; 17; D.C. LXIV 2-3.  
22 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 5. See also at Tac. Hist. I 18: nocuit antiquus rigor et nimia severitas, cui iam pares 
non sumus. 
23 His obituary in I 49 makes this evident: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam cum 
virtutibus [...] maior privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset. 
24 Tac. Hist. I 6. For other references to Galba’s old age, see I 5; I 7; I 12; I 49. 
25 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 19, when appointing ambassadors.  
26 See note 21 above. 
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by arbitrary executions, and the massacre of unarmed soldiers27. According to 
Tacitus, this created the perfect mix to provoke sedition and revolt: fear degenerated 
into hatred that, with the proper encouragement, moved the praetorians to acclaim 
Otho as emperor and support him in his plan to get rid of Galba28. To these 
circumstances must be added Otho’s fierce resentment, for Galba had not adopted 
him but preferred Piso as heir to the throne; and the unrest of the city soldiers, who 
had not received their promised donative and were apprehensive about their 
worsening conditions of service29. 
It is difficult to explain what follows next because the situation became more and 
more confused until the actors seemed out of control, losing the ability to judge 
whether what they were doing was right or wrong. Tacitus’ very detailed description 
lasts for several chapters30. Disloyalty spread like a contagion among the legions 
(infecit ea tabes legionum), who were both terrified of death and at the same time 
bold enough to dare the foulest of crimes: killing their emperor (cf. Tac. Hist. I 26-
28). It was fear together with greed that made the soldiers act in this way: the sight of 
an old emperor allowing his subordinates to practice indiscriminate cruel behavior, 
and his refusal to pay them their customary donative, made them fear for their own 
future. Fear worked as the causa of their forgetting their duty and loyalty: they 
rebelled. But the result of the action caused by fear was also fear: fear as finis. The 
soldiers’ sedition, the fact that some had acclaimed a new emperor when the old one 
was still alive, made them even more afraid of the consequences of their actions31. 
They did not know what the best course was now: they had betrayed their loyalty to 
Galba by breaking their sacramentum32, some placing themselves on the side of the 
traitor in the city, Otho, and some acclaiming a new head abroad, Vitellius33. 
According to Tacitus, city soldiers and legionaries, supporters and contestants were 
left at the mercy of whatever may occur by chance and without any warning, and 
therefore rash judgements and frenzied actions were highly likely (cf. Tac. Hist. I 31).  
There was a state of uncertainty in the city, «Rome was in a state of excitement 
and horror-stricken»34, which was increased by rumors coming from different places. 
Tacitus explains how in civil wars, different groups on the same side often fight for 
                                               
27 Marines enrolled by Nero who met Galba with demands as he entered Rome. For the massacre of 
unarmed soldiers in Galba’s march towards Rome, see Tac. Hist. I 5; Suet. Galb. 12, 1 with DAMON 
(2003) comm ad loc.  
28 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 6. Cf. also Suet. Galb. 11-12; Plut. Galb. 15, 4; and DAMON (2003), 106-110. 
29 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 5-8. For MURISON (1993), 60, Galba’s behavior, especially towards the 
praetorians, was «utterly foolish». 
30 For Galba’s death in other sources, see Suet. Galb. 19-20; Plut. Galb. 26-27; D.C. LXIV 7, 4. 
31 Twenty-three soldiers from the Bodyguard saluted Otho as emperor on 15th January. Cf. Tac. 
Hist. I 27. 
32 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 12; 51. Sacramentum: literally means ‘oath’, in this case, the military oath or 
sacramentum militare was the oath taken by the soldiers swearing their loyalty to the emperor, cf. Veg. 
Mil. II 5. See also ASH (2009), 90-91. 
33 Vitellius was made head of the army in Lower Germany, cf. D.C. LXIII 4; Tac. Hist. I 18-19.  
34 Tac. Hist. I 50: Trepidam urbem ac simul atrocitatem recentis sceleris. 
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different reasons, so that a single cause can conceal a whole range of varied motives. 
Even the process of declaring war tends to be less organized than in a foreign conflict, 
where an individual does not have to choose sides. As Ash puts it, «escalation, rather 
than a deliberate declaration of war, typifies civil conflict, which makes untangling 
the moral issues particularly challenging»35. It was total confusion. Otho himself did 
not even know whether he was still a private citizen (privatus) or the emperor 
(imperator populi Romani), or even a public enemy (hostis)36. And people in the city 
held loyalty cheap; for them, unstable governments meant that fear and flattery 
became general practice, and the more endemic they became, the greater was the 
danger, because it affected everyone (cf. Tac. Hist. I 33; 36). 
A distinctive characteristic of both fear and civil war, that can increase axiological 
confusion in the agents, is the corruption of language. Thucydides had expressed this 
long before Tacitus. The passage on stasis at Corcyra is a classic example of Thucydi-
des showing that civil war and the devaluation of language mutually reinforced one 
another: «they exchanged their usual evaluations of deeds for new ones, in the light 
of what they now thought justified»37. Subversion of political vocabulary was some-
thing that Thucydides had denounced as an inevitable feature of internal political 
struggle, and Sallust would pick this up in his presentation of decline: «in very truth 
we have long since lost the true names for things»38. Remarkably, Tacitus has Otho 
accusing Galba of corrupting language or changing the customary meaning of words: 
«For what other men call crimes he [Galba] calls ‘remedies’, falsely naming cruelty 
‘strictness’, avarice ‘frugality’; the punishment and insults you suffer, ‘discipline’»39. 
Obviously corruption of language leads to confusion, and if the terms in question 
are value words - such as the virtues and vices that Tacitus indicated through Otho’s 
mouth - this will give rise to axiological confusion. Ugly and disgraceful actions like 
cruelty, avarice or torture need to be labeled with positive-sounding words taken from 
the traditional canon of Roman virtues: severitas, parsimonia, disciplina. Words and 
language are the means that sustain communication in society; if words become 
corrupted, the life of society will not remain unaffected. Otho accuses Galba of 
reshaping the evaluation of what is considered cruelty or insults; thus he will 
unconsciously start changing the grounds on which he operates and, in the end, his 
conduct. Words can not only create realities, but also shift standards of behavior, 
producing confusion and misperception towards good and evil.  
                                               
35 ASH (1999), 2. 
36 Tac. Hist. I 37. For Tacitus on Otho, see STOLTE (1973); SOCHAT (1981b); KEITEL (1984); 
PERKINS (1993); for Otho in general, WELLESLEY (1975); MORGAN (2006); ROCHE (2008); CHARLES-
ANAGNOSTOU-LAOUTIDES (2014). 
37 Th. III 82, 4: καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. 
Wilson’s translation in (1982), 18-20. Cf. also SWAIN (1993). 
38 In Cato’s speech at the Senate, Cat. 52, 11: iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum 
amisimus. For more corruption of language in Sallust, see Hist. I 55, 24; III 48, 12-13. 
39 Tac. Hist. I 37: Nam quae alii scelera, hic remedia vocat, dum falsis nominibus severitatem pro 
saevitia, parsimoniam pro avaritia, supplicia et contumelias vestras disciplinam appellat. For the 
corruption of language in Thucydides, Sallust and Tacitus, see SPIELBERG (2017). 
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In Tacitus’ account, Galba was responsible for inspiring fear and discontent not 
only in the soldiers, but also in the people, and therefore he was accountable for 
creating the climate for confusion to arise. Soldiers and civilians became so confused 
that the former betrayed and killed their old emperor; the latter insulted him and 
flattered the newly-acclaimed one, not knowing what was best for them. In the events 
of January AD 69 narrated by Tacitus, fear, anger, resentment were emotions that 
confused and clouded the intellect’s ability to choose right over wrong. The historian 
does not accuse Galba of acting out of these emotions, but he holds the emperor 
accountable for having awoken them in others. The confusion created extends to 
Tacitus’ final ambiguous and almost contradictory judgment on Galba’s person and 
his government: «his own character was mediocre, rather free from vices than rich in 
virtues [...] when he was a commoner he was too big for his station: the universal view 




Even though fear and the lack of fides (perfidia) appear as paramount for Tacitus 
in explaining the confusion and chaos in which the different scenarios of the empire 
were immersed in AD 69, it was not always possible even to define whether some 
individuals were in fact loyal or disloyal to their cause41. The confusion of the times 
provided no clear panorama, and commanders did not commit themselves to one 
cause lest it proved inexpedient. «There were many desertions, as is always the case in 
civil wars»42. 
Throughout Tacitus’ narrative, ambiguous or wavering behaviors are seen in 
leaders and generals who, according to the historian, should have behaved otherwise 
and followed superior motives. This «failure of leadership» has even been offered as 
an explanation for the three successive civil wars43. And it is in the Vitellian faction 
where Tacitus portrays this failure more prominently, with several important generals 
betraying their emperor. Even though Tacitus undoubtedly considered it a good thing 
that Vitellius was vanquished, that did not mean that those who switched their 
allegiance to Vespasian should be praised, because they had twice committed treason 
towards their emperors, first Galba and then Vitellius44. Among these commanders, 
we find Vitellius’ principal aide: Caecina.  
                                               
40 Tac. Hist. I 49, quoted above n. 23. 
41 For perfidia, see I 51; II 27; II 60; II 99-100; III 4; III 9; III 12; III 31; III 46; III 57; III 61-62; III 
70; III 86. 
42 Tac. Hist. I 34: crebris, ut in civili bello, transfugiis. See also II 75: fluxam per discordias militum 
fidem. 
43 Cf. MASTER (2012), 85. 
44 Tac. Hist. III 86: rei publicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci, sed imputare perfidiam non 
possunt qui Vitellium Vespasiano prodidere, cum a Galba descivissent. See YAVETZ (1969). 
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A. Caecina Alienus is described by Tacitus as a handsome young man of great 
ambition, who had won over the legions he was in charge of by his skillful oratory45. 
He had supported Galba after Nero’s death, but had afterwards joined Vitellius’ army 
in Germany and, together with Fabius Valens - his colleague and, later, rival - had 
defeated Otho’s troops at Bedriacum. Tacitus records that Valens claimed to have 
saved Caecina’s life - and perhaps boasted too much - and enjoyed the fervent support 
of the legions of the Lower Germany, hinting that this may have been the reason why 
Caecina’s loyalty to Vitellius started to waver (cf. Tac. Hist. II 93). However, a couple 
of chapters later the historian suggests different theories for Caecina’s change, not 
actually endorsing any one of them. Tacitus mentions Caecina’s old ambition 
(ambitio vetus) and newly acquired indolence (torpor recens) which, together with 
the memory of his hatred and jealousy (odiorum invidiaeque) for Valens as Vitellius’ 
favorite, may have moved him «to acquire credit and influence with a new emperor» 
(Tac. Hist. II 99, i.e. Vespasian).  
In spite of having different characters and temperaments, during the campaign to 
put Vitellius on the throne Valens and Caecina had previously worked together, 
overcoming their apparent rivalry and suspicion: «they laid aside their hatred and 
devoted themselves to the common interest»46. They had won the decisive first battle 
of Bedriacum and made progress together on their march towards Rome. Tacitus 
explains that when jealousy and fear of losing the first place in Vitellius’ favor took 
hold of Caecina, he decided to change sides to the Flavians and abandon Vitellius. 
Furthermore, he used all his resources to undermine his own legions’ loyalty to the 
emperor (cf. Tac. Hist. II 101). The axiological confusion here is evident: when fides 
is corrupted - and Tacitus talks of vilem fidem (worthless loyalty, Tac. Hist. II 101) - 
there are no longer any clear signposts to the right course of action. Instead of 
collaboration with comrades for the benefit of the res publica, times of civil war 
subverted ideals into zeal for one’s own expediency and advancement, obliterating 
the honorable path. Caecina had first transferred his loyalty from Galba to Vitellius, 
then from Vitellius to Vespasian, but it seemed that he could not remain loyal to 
anyone. In AD 79 he was accused of conspiring with Eprius Marcellus against the 
emperor Vespasian and was murdered at a dinner party on Titus’ orders (cf. Suet. 
Tit. 6, 2 and D.C. LXIV 16, 3). Caecina’s disloyalty proved self-destructive. 
Caecina’s betrayal is narrated in some detail, as he was one of the two 
commanders-in-chief of the Vitellian forces, but he was not the only important 
general who deserted Vitellius. Sextus Lucilius Bassus had been promoted by Vitellius 
from prefect of the cavalry to commander of the fleets at Ravenna and Misenum, but 
according to Tacitus it was his disappointment at not being immediately (non statim) 
chosen as prefect of the Praetorian Guard that set in motion his treacherous plan to 
                                               
45 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 53, a very different description from the one found in Plut. Otho 6, 3: «Caecina 
had neither the speech nor the outward appearance of a Roman citizen, but was offensive and strange, 
a man of huge stature.» 
46 Tac. Hist. II 30: sed condito odio eandem utilitatem fovere. 
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betray his emperor47. The historian’s words leave no doubt of the shame and guilt he 
attributes to Bassus’ conduct in «taking the revenge of his unjust resentment with 
disgraceful treachery» (iniquam iracundiam flagitiosa perfidia ulciscebatur, Tac. 
Hist. II 100). Bassus’ treason brought about the revolt of the fleet and their change to 
Vespasian’s side (cf. Tac. Hist. III 12). As with Caecina, Tacitus implies that Bassus 
also took an active part in corrupting the fleet which, having previously served Otho, 
were not too reluctant to rebel (cf. Tac. Hist. II 101). Bassus himself was temporarily 
taken prisoner, but soon set free. He was later appointed governor of the province of 
Judaea in AD 71, and died a year or two after that (cf. Joseph. BJ VII 6). 
Caecina and Bassus are both described by Tacitus as dishonest or bad men (malos) 
for betraying the emperor whom they had sworn an oath to protect (Tac. Hist. II 
100). However, the same or even more censure falls to the historians who, when 
recording these turbulent times during the Flavian dynasty, had justified the conduct 
of the two generals as being «patriotic and desirous of peace» (curam pacis et amorem 
rei publicae). In fact Tacitus uses the verb «betray» to refer to these historians, who 
were prepared to falsify the truth in order to flatter: corruptas in adulationem causas, 
tradidere48. This is the veritas pluribus modis infracta («truth shattered in many 
different ways») to which Tacitus refers at the beginning of the Histories: because 
such false historians cared more for peace, they betrayed truth.  
Another significant disloyal defection from Vitellius’ side recorded by Tacitus is 
the case of Valerius Festus. According to Tacitus, this Valerius was a young relative 
of Vitellius and commander of the legion in Africa (cf. Tac. Hist. IV 49), who at first 
loyally supported the Vitellian faction and joined in the enthusiasm of the provincials. 
Tacitus does not give an explanation of why he soon (mox) became unsteady and 
began double dealing: supporting Vitellius officially but staying in secret communi-
cation with Vespasian49. The undoubted advantage of his deceit was that he could 
quickly change his support to whichever side proved victorious. Probably Valerius 
soon realized that Vitellius’ side was less prepared and did not look very promising. 
Valerius’ axiological confusion is clearly shown when Tacitus reports that, after 
Vitellius’ death and therefore now eager to prove his allegiance to Vespasian, Valerius 
was involved in the assassination of L. Calpurnius Piso, governor of the province of 
Africa, who had been accused of plotting against the emperor Vespasian (cf. Tac. 
Hist. IV 49-50). Making sure that Piso was in fact murdered in the confusion of the 
moment, Valerius Festus won gratitude from the Flavians and was later rewarded by 
a long career of service under the emperor Domitian50. In narrating this episode, 
Tacitus contrasts this example of perfidious personal expediency with the noble 
conduct of a slave who, when he realized that Piso was going to be killed, bravely gave 
                                               
47 Cf. Tac. Hist. II 100-101; III 12. According to ASH (2007b), 378, non statim underscores Tacitus’ 
disapproval as it makes it look like an impatient and unrealistic desire.  
48 Tac. Hist. II 101: curam pacis et amorem rei publicae. 
49 Tac. Hist. II 98: ac primo Valerius Festus legatus studia provincialium cum fide iuvit. 
50 For Valerius Festus’ later career, see GALLIVAN (1981), 186-220 and ABASCAL (2018). 
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his life for his master51. This slave was probably one of the «slaves [with] a fidelity 
which defied even torture» (Tac. Hist. I 3), whom Tacitus talks about at the beginning 
of the Histories. 
These changed allegiances and broken oaths certainly did not look like the struggle 
for personal glory of republican times: then - at least in theory - the generals had 
competed in acts of virtus for the benefit of the res publica, and attained glory as a 
consequence. Now, by contrast, they competed not in acts of courage but cunning to 
destroy their rivals and secure their own future in safety. Tacitus describes these 
commanders as having taken advantage of the situation, and when the test came, they 
chose the utile (expedient) over the honestum (honorable) course of action, working 
for their own personal benefit instead of the good of Rome52. Their confusion was of 
a different sort from that produced under Galba. The confusion created by the old 
emperor made others mistake what was good and what was evil. Vitellius’ comman-
ders, on the contrary, seemed to have lost sight of the fact that what was good for 
themselves was not always good for Rome; accordingly, the decisions they took had 
near-disastrous consequences for the Empire. Tacitus clearly blames Vitellius’ 
military leaders for the anxiety and restlessness felt by Vitellius’ own party: «Nor on 
the side of Vitellius were men’s minds at ease; their distress, however, arose from more 
fatal discord, due not to the suspicions of the common soldiers, but to the treachery 
of the commanders»53. Amidst the turmoil of a civil war it was certainly difficult to 
establish what it meant to fight rei publicae causa and to stay firm; but working for 
individual aims and fostering one’s own advancement while risking the wellbeing of 




In his Histories, Tacitus shows that in a situation of political disorder, chaos and 
especially fear, everybody is more liable to err in the perception of what is good or 
bad for them and make the wrong decision. His narrative illustrates this liability 
persistently. However, Tacitus also makes clear that these circumstances may have 
made people more prone to confusion, but they did not necessarily force them to it or 
determine their actions.  
It is quite significant, then, that in the midst of all the horrible crimes, treachery 
and falsity during the civil wars, Tacitus - as if to give the reader a respite - narrates 
the acts of the few who did maintain their judgement unaffected and behaved nobly. 
At the beginning of the work he had acknowledged that there was still room for 
                                               
51 Tac. Hist. IV 50: servus egregio mendacio se Pisonem esse respondit ac statim obtruncatur. 
52 Tacitus makes a similar judgement about Antonius Primus, and also other generals who helped 
the emperors of AD 69 along their way towards power, such as Fabius Valens. For Tacitus’ treatment of 
these generals, see for example, DOREY (1958); MORGAN (1994a), (1997) and (2006), 174-189; 
MEULDER (1995); ASH (1999). 
53 Tac. Hist. III 12: Ne in Vitellii quidem partibus quietae mentes: exitiosiore discordia non 
suspicionibus vulgi, sed perfidia ducum turbabantur. 
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virtues: «Yet this age was not so barren of virtue that it did not display noble exam-
ples»54. He describes good mothers and wives supporting or accompanying their sons 
and husbands; men displaying courage and firmness; and slaves showing their 
loyalty55. In the last section of this paper, I would like to show what Tacitus sees as the 
defining factors that make people maintain their principles and values even under 
terrible circumstances56. It is with these examples that Tacitus the historian becomes 
a guide; by providing instances of good behavior, he directs the readers out of 
confusion. 
If fear was the general condition and emotional state of the majority under a civil 
war - because it was difficult to know which side would end up being stronger - it 
follows that it was the opposite of fear that made some people overcome the inaction 
or paralysis created by fear on the one hand, or the rashness resulting from fear on the 
other. Tacitus emphasizes a particular quality that seemed to counteract fear, and 
work as its antidote, namely firmness or constantia.  
Constantia or steadfastness consisted mainly of keeping one’s independence of 
thought, being determined to hold on to one’s principles and not changing them out 
of expediency or fear. This was certainly an aspect of the virtue of courage (virtus), 
although perhaps expressed in a subtler way than the spectacular bravery that soldiers 
could show in battle57. Tacitus gives examples of the constantia of military men such 
as Julius Agrestis and Vocula, whom he praises for being two good generals who 
restored discipline in the armies and showed «outstanding determination» (notabilis 
constantia) and «admirable firmness» (mira constantia) respectively58. This, of course, 
contrasted greatly with - for example - Galba’s «disgraceful want of firmness» (foeda 
inconstantia) exhibited at some point59, or the «innate fickleness» (insita levitas) 
displayed by many (Tac. Hist. II 101). Constantia was a way of expressing valor and 
determination to maintain one’s loyalties in spite of danger; firmness in the pursuit of 
one’s aims in life without being swayed by good or bad circumstances.  
Certainly, a model of constancy in the Histories is Marius Celsus60. In AD 63 
Celsus had led the Fifteenth Legion to war against the Parthians (cf. Tac. Ann. XV 
25), and was designated by Nero as suffect consul for AD 69. Later he was called to 
be an adviser to Galba, to whom he remained loyal till the end61. After Galba’s death, 
Celsus was in danger of being killed, but when he pleaded guilty of constant loyalty 
                                               
54 Tac. Hist. I 3: non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum ut non et bona exempla prodiderit. 
55 Tac. Hist. I 3: Comitatae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coniuges: propinqui 
audentes, constantes generi, contumax etiam adversus tormenta servorum fides; supremae clarorum 
virorum necessitates fortiter toleratae et laudatis antiquorum mortibus pares exitus. 
56 For good men in Tacitus in general, see RÍHOVÁ (1974). 
57 For the role of virtus and constantia, see BALMACEDA (2017), 199-208. 
58 Tac. Hist. III 54 and IV 26 respectively. On Vocula see ASH (2010), 211-231. 
59 Tac. Hist. I 19. The same idea is conveyed in I 7, referring to his «weakness of character» (mobilitas 
ingenii).  
60 On Celsus, see TOWNEND (1962); SHOTTER (1978), 197-200. 
61 Cf. Tac. Hist. I 45: Marium Celsum, consulem designatum et Galbae usque in extremas res 
amicum fidumque. 
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to Galba (constanter servatae erga Galbam fidei crimen confessus), Otho saved him 
and took him into his inner circle (inter intimos amicos habuit, Tac. Hist. I 71). 
Tacitus also shows Celsus working faithfully and prudently under Otho, displaying 
his energy (industria) and vigor (vigor), and even after the emperor’s fall, Celsus was 
able to maintain his consulship under Vitellius (a remarkable fact considering that he 
found himself on the ‘wrong’, defeated, side). He survived the civil wars and under 
Vespasian served as governor of Germania Inferior62.  
Tacitus portrays Celsus as working for the regime, using all his talents and 
achieving brilliant successes (res egregiae gestae, Tac. Hist. II 24), but never allowing 
his blameless character (innocentia) to be compromised (cf. Tac. Hist. I 45). 
Throughout his career, Celsus was in real danger several times, the worst being when 
after Galba’s murder, the soldiers asked for Celsus’ capital punishment. In their 
confusion they demanded Celsus’ life, because after having killed the emperor, they 
were obviously afraid of his faithful friend. Out of fear-inspired axiological confusion 
«they hated his energy and upright character as if they were vicious qualities» (Tac. 
Hist. I 45), instead of trying to win over the good man to their side for the new 
government. Celsus, however, never defended himself at the cost of his honesty or 
principles. Moreover, together with his constantia, he displayed remarkable loyalty: 
fides integra (Tac. Hist. I 71). 
Fides became a serious concern in times of civil war, as it was necessary to maintain 
one’s loyalty to the emperor to whom one had sworn allegiance. Traditionally, fides 
inspired brave actions and also implied a touch of magnanimity in the sense that the 
loyal subordinate was able to put his own benefit in second place for the sake of a 
larger cause, namely the res publica, in this case, the emperor. But fides could be a 
dangerous quality in civil war, as faithfulness and loyalty were held cheap owing to 
the instability of emperors holding on to unsteady power. Besides, for a subordinate 
to be loyal to his commander when the latter was not totally worthy of this loyalty 
could be counted as unsafe. However, Tacitus’ praise of Celsus’ constantia in showing 
fides first to Galba and then, after his death, to Otho, suggests that Tacitus saw fides 
as a quality which required much courage and firmness. 
Marius Celsus in Tacitus is especially moderate in his desires; industrious in his 
work as a general, a good leader to his soldiers, prudent, and above all, firm in his 
loyalty to whoever stood at the head of the res publica. He may be one of the great 
men under bad emperors (viri magni sub malis principibus) to whom Tacitus referred 
in the Agricola (42, 5), since he did what he could to contribute to the welfare of the 
state even in civil war.  
Also faithful, but less fortunate than Marius Celsus was Junius Blaesus, whose 
steadfast loyalty is also praised by Tacitus. This Blaesus first appears in the Histories 
joining the Vitellian forces in Book I (59) and later on Tacitus gives a more complete 
portrait of this man whom he would even qualify as sanctus, a high tribute indeed 
                                               
62 Cf. ECK (1982), 287-91. 
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(Tac. Hist. III 39). Blaesus came from an illustrious family63 and was very rich, 
generous, and cultured in character. The sum of these qualities seems to have 
confused Vitellius: very soon the emperor was convinced - particularly by his brother, 
Lucius Vitellius - that Blaesus was a threat to the throne, but he camouflaged his 
hatred under servile flattery64. Tacitus shows Vitellius’ behavior as unreasonable, 
since it makes no sense to destroy a man of steadfast loyalty (fidei obstinatio), who put 
all his resources into supporting the emperor and had no interest at all in becoming 
head of the empire (cf. Tac. Hist. III 39).  
Tacitus shows how Blaesus’ fides - a virtue to be treasured in times of sedition and 
betrayal - counted for nothing, as Vitellius mistakenly feared his faithful friend. 
Finally, Blaesus, victim of Vitellius’ confused and fearful state of mind - trepidanti 
inter scelus metumque - was poisoned by the emperor65. Here it is the emperor’s 
conduct which falls prey to axiological confusion, «behaving irrationally and failing 
to see what is in his best interests»66. 
Tacitus intersperses more examples of great loyalty and firmness throughout the 
narrative, such as the case of Sempronius Densus, a centurion who, in spite of being 
seriously wounded, bravely defended Piso during the sedition against Galba and 
enabled him to escape (cf. Tac. Hist. I 31); or the governor of Raetia, Porcius 
Septiminus, who remained incorruptibly loyal to Vitellius (cf. Tac. Hist. III 5). 
Further examples of fidelity are the four centurions of the Twenty-Second Legion, 
Nonius, Donatius, Romilius and Calpurnius, who remained faithful to Galba and 
were therefore executed on the orders of Vitellius, their crime being loyalty, «worst of 
charges among rebels»67. 
It was clear, then, that constantia and fides in civil war demanded refusing to be 
ruled by fear or to act on it. According to Tacitus it was firmness and steadfastness 
that made these exemplary men keep a clear head and not become confused as to 
what was right or wrong, regardless of how everybody else was behaving. Tacitus 
shows how the dilemma of choosing between the honorable course (honestum) and 
the advantageous one (utile) was solved in the ideal Ciceronian way, that is, by 
choosing the honestum or the right thing to do, which won them the glory of posterity 
and in this sense became advantageous and beneficial as well. 
By means of his narration of history, Tacitus shows how and why some Romans 
were prevented from acting according to particular virtues and took the wrong path 
during the frenzied year of the four emperors. He demonstrates how axiological 
confusion works by taking a very Roman approach to the historical records of a 
particularly complex period. Focusing on the behavior of different figures, he gives 
                                               
63 He had the Antonii and the Junii as his ancestors, cf. III 38. 
64 Tac. Hist. II 59. For Junius Blaesus, see ASH (2007b), comm ad loc. 
65 For the episode of Blaesus’ death at III 38-39, see MILLER-JONES (1978); GALTIER (1981). 
Another account of Blaesus’ death is narrated - without naming him - by Suet. Vit. 14. 
66 LEVENE (1997), 139. 
67 Tac. Hist. I 59: fidei crimine, gravissimo inter desciscentis. 
CATALINA  BALMACEDA 
 
 166 Π Η Γ Η / F O N S  5 (2020) 
 
examples to imitate or to avoid (cf. Liv. Praef. 10), and thus illustrates axiological 
confusion in action.  
Tacitus shows the tensions and ambiguities of the period he is recounting; he is 
concerned not only to denote bad examples, but also to find new role models and steer 
the reader between rash action on the one hand and servile passivity on the other. 
Vital to his purpose was the portrayal of good and active Romans who maintained 
their fides in spite of personal danger and for whom constantia in working for the res 
publica was paramount.  
In Tacitus’ view, the civil wars that followed Nero’s death made political behavior 
more radical. Widespread confusion and chaos had major ill effects on the capacity 
for discernment exercised by emperors, soldiers and people, preventing them from 
evaluating actions according to the customary criteria of good and bad. The turmoil 
of continuous civil wars that produced persistent fear and mistrust among Romans 
resulted in the axiological confusion that Tacitus illustrates with expert skill. The 
narrative portraying this confusion with all its bad examples, moreover, helps him to 
fulfil «the highest function of history»: that, in spite of everything, «virtues may not 
be passed over in silence»68. 
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